As far as I know, this is one of the first times that the subject, which is so central to the future of the society in Israel/Palestine, has been discussed in the Israeli academic world in an open forum with many participants. The courage to discuss this issue deserves highlighting these days, and it represents the real and free academic spirit that has recently been under strong attack.
ideological Zionists who came voluntarily, but the majority became Zionists only once their lives in the original homeland became unbearable. Zionism colonization in that period was advanced by using all the loopholes existing under Ottoman and especially British rule-by purchasing and receiving land, erecting settlements, and building a military and demographic force.
Over the next twenty years, the project became one of "internal colonialism," which includes ethnic expulsion and Judaization of the Israeli territory within the Green Line.
After 1967, it changed shades again and became almost classic "state--led" or "external" colonialism in which the state settles its citizens beyond the state's sovereign borders and seeks to appropriate it. Simultaneously, Israel deepened its liberal--democratic character inside the Green Line, primarily for its Jewish population. This factor aided in building a broad consensus around defining the regime as a "Jewish and democratic state", while ignoring the eviction, colonialism, and the oppression of the Arab citizens living inside the Green Line, most conspicuously the Bedouins in the south.
In the past two decades, the regime between Jordan and Sea has been transforming into a new stage, I have termed it 'oppressive consolidation'. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has sought to stabilize the situation by carrying out strategic withdrawals-from Area A, from Lebanon, and in 2005, from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. In doing this, it has shown a certain willingness to allow the existence of a quasi--state Palestinian unit that would grant a degree of self--determination to the Palestinians, while legitimizing an "agreed--upon solution" that maintains Jewish control over most of the land between Jordan and Sea. To One--state proponents, then, seek to run counter to the grain of history, and create an entity that is without precedent, in which an ethnic state merges with a neighboring rival nation.
The lack of precedent does not by itself prevent the one--state option, but one may still askwhy should the first such union occur in Israel/Palestine? Is it reasonable that a state Geopolitical analysis indicates a significant structural difference: South Africa was created as a single, recognized state that became a member of the United Nations, which at some stage denied citizenship to most of its black citizens. The blacks demanded a return of full citizenship in their state, which eventually was aided by the country's move to democracy.
In contrast, the juridical foundation of Israel/Palestine is two states, and Israeli citizenship was never granted, and hence never revoked from the Palestinians of of the West Bank and the Gaza.
A similarity to the South Africa case is found with respect to neighboring Namibia, a territory over which South Africa received an international mandate in 1920. When the mandate ended, South Africa refused to leave and imposed the apartheid laws on that Second, the proposed model allows for a gradual decentralization of many aspects of governance into metropolitan spaces, which would reflect the high degree of urbanization in Israel/Palestine. The urban scale is promising, as it neutralizes the "burden" of historical, religious and territorial issues, so dominant in other scales. We can picture, for example, such functioning metropolitan regions around Nazareth--Karmiel, Haifa, Nablus, Ramallah, Gush Dan, and Beersheba, along with the autonomous metropolitan region of Jerusalem/al--Quds. Urban spaces are generally open and encourage movement and mixing; they can introduce more direct, inclusive and democratic forms of government less dependent on fixed identities; they can reorient public discourse to present future issues, rather than burdening history and identity.
Third, confederation opens the possibility for novel and original thinking that may rekindle the hope for peace which has been all but extinguished over the past decade. The framework proposed here provides a better (albeit imperfect) answer to the deep problems of the conflict than the other proposed solutions, in a way that does not impinge 
